A Tampered Claude Code Extension Sat in Cursor 11 Hours
Ricardo Argüello, November 15, 2026
Quick test. If I asked you today how many machines in your company have the Claude Code extension installed, how long would it take you to answer?
And who would know? Where is that list?
On October 29, for about 11 hours, that list mattered. Cursor’s marketplace was serving two builds of the extension, 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, that Anthropic did not write. They ran on macOS and Windows, and the added code tried to leave an attacker’s SSH key on the machine.
An editor extension runs as the developer. It can read what the developer reads. Files, environment variables, the .ssh folder. The publisher name on the listing tells you whose name is on it. It does not tell you who built the bytes you installed.
The record, in order
Cursor’s security notice is the primary source, and it is short on adjectives. The builds were available on October 29 from 2:27 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. Pacific, which is 11 hours and 8 minutes. Cursor’s words: “These malicious versions of the extension were not developed by Anthropic.”
Anthropic’s account, as StepSecurity quotes it: “A malicious actor used access to Cursor’s marketplace to publish a tampered copy.” Anthropic’s Felix Rieseberg added on X that it was not a compromise of Anthropic’s systems or employee laptops, and that the versions on Anthropic’s official channels are not affected.
On how many people installed it, Cursor said on X the incident affected at most 5,000 users. Its security notice gives no count. That is a ceiling, not a number of compromised machines.
Cursor pulled the builds, took its marketplace offline while it checked other extensions, rotated its keys and had the attacker’s server taken down. The next clean release is 2.1.314.
What the extra code did
StepSecurity’s analysis says the bad file was the clean 2.1.312 bundle with a loader of about 7 KB stuck on the front. It runs on plain Node.js, and merely loading the module is enough to trigger it.
It did six things in sequence.
| Step | What it tried |
|---|---|
| Recon | Host details, the git email, and the names (not the values) of up to 40 environment variables that look like credentials |
| Key | Add an attacker SSH key to authorized_keys |
| SSH | Switch the SSH service on |
| Tunnel | Open a reverse tunnel to the attacker’s server |
| Persistence | A LaunchAgent on macOS, a scheduled task on Windows |
| Beacon | Send the recon report home |
Two caveats. Cursor says the SSH steps would mostly fail without admin rights, while the key, the persistence and the data collection could still have worked. And StepSecurity reports no credential values read and no second-stage download. The real exposure was someone logging in with the planted key while the tunnel was up.
Cursor’s warning is the one to remember. “Uninstalling the extension may not be sufficient.” The persistence scripts keep running without it.
What is still open
Nobody has said how the attacker got into the marketplace. StepSecurity says its write-up does not cover it.
The early reporting also pointed the wrong way. OpenSourceMalware’s first report named Open VSX, per Socket, which then checked Open VSX and npm records, found nothing for 2.1.313, and said that does not show a compromise of Anthropic’s official distribution. Phorion corrected its own analysis a few hours after publishing, according to its changelog, to point at Cursor’s marketplace.
And The Next Web relays a claim from Ars Technica: Phorion’s CTO, Luke Roberts, says that 2.1.313 was posted to Anthropic’s official account. That contradicts both Anthropic and Cursor. I am going with Cursor’s notice and StepSecurity’s analysis and leaving the rest as disputed.
What I would change on Monday
This part is my judgment, not something the reports say.
Give the extension list an owner. One name, one place, updated when someone installs something. It sounds like paperwork until the day you need it.
Delay new versions on machines that touch production. This window lasted 11 hours. A 48-hour wait would have kept a team off both builds. The exception is an urgent security patch, and that one gets approved by a person.
Take production credentials off laptops. The code went looking for exactly this, the names of environment variables. If the production database key lives in a developer’s .env, any extension with the right name can reach it. With short-lived development keys and minimal permissions, the same incident costs an afternoon.
Rehearse the rebuild. If the vendor tells you to consider rebuilding the machine, how long does it take your team, and how long to rotate every key that passed through it?
When we review a company’s development environment at IQ Source, that list is where we start: which extensions and coding tools run on each machine, which credentials are within their reach, and who answers when one is tampered with. The same pattern of a compromised platform and exposed keys shows up in Railway, Zeabur and OpenCode and in LiteLLM, and what comes after the scanner is in AI code security for the enterprise.
Count your team’s extensions this week and put a name next to each. If it takes more than a day, you know where to go next.
Let’s review what runs on your team’s machinesFrequently Asked Questions
What happened to the Claude Code extension in Cursor's marketplace in October 2026?
On October 29, 2026, between 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. Pacific, Cursor's marketplace served two altered builds of the Claude Code extension, 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, for macOS and Windows. They tried to add an attacker's SSH key and install persistence. Cursor pulled them and says Anthropic did not develop them.
How do I know if my team installed the tampered Claude Code extension?
Check whether anyone installed or updated the Claude Code extension from Cursor's marketplace on October 29, 2026, and ended up on version 2.1.312 or 2.1.313. Then look for an unknown key in authorized_keys and new startup tasks. Cursor published check instructions and cleanup scripts for macOS and Windows.
Is uninstalling the tampered Claude Code extension enough, or do I need to rebuild the machine?
Cursor warns that uninstalling the extension may not be sufficient, because the code drops persistence scripts that keep running by themselves. If you find the attacker's key, isolate the host, remove the key and processes, and rotate credentials from a clean system. Cursor notes the machine may need to be rebuilt.
How can a company protect itself from compromised editor extensions like the Claude Code one in Cursor?
A company protects itself from compromised editor extensions with an extension inventory that has a named owner, a few days of delay before accepting new versions, production credentials kept off developer laptops, and a rehearsed plan to rebuild a machine and rotate keys. The publisher name on a listing does not prove who built the code.
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